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Case Comments
International Law Cases in National Courtst
Sovereign Immunity Thwarts Persistent Litigant
The Small Claims Court, an unlikely forum for questions of international
law, was recently confronted with a litigant whose insistence upon seeking
support and maintenance eventually required the attention of the United
States Attorney, acting on application of the State Department. Menon v.
Weil, 320 N.Y.S.2d 405 (N.Y. City Small Claims Court 197 1).
Plaintiff, the estranged wife of a United Nations field worker stationed in
South Korea, attempted to collect support and maintenance by twenty
actions against various UN officials ranging in rank from the undersecretary to middle echelon administrators, on the theory that these
officials were "agents" of the absent Mr. Menon. The UN officials, relying
on The Convention on Privileges and Immunity of the United Nations
(TIAS 6900), had rejected mailed service of the small claims summonses
with the result that twenty default judgments had been entered as well as a
garnishment of the personal bank account of a UN undersecretary.
The U.S. Attorney, acting for the State Department, then made a "suggestion of immunity" and moved to dismiss the twenty consolidated actions. Mrs. Menon resisted the motion.
The court held that the suggestion of sovereign immunity should be
accepted as a conclusive determination without further inquiry, even
against a claim of prior waiver, or one that the assertion of immunity
violated an adversary's rights. The court distinguished the situation in
which the immunity claim is asserted by the alleged sovereign entity itself,
in which case a court may inquire whether the activity at issue is governmental or commercial and proceed on the merits in the latter instance.
As a separate and independent ground for dismissal, the court cited
Section 18-a of The Convention on Privileges and Immunity of the United
*Member of the New York Bar. Assisted by Ronald A. Wilkoe of the New York Bar.
tA number of cases involving questions of international law have been decided recently
by federal, state and local courts.
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Nations (effective as to the United States on April 29, 1970), which
provides for the immunity from legal process of all UN officials in respect
of acts performed by them in their official capacity.
The court therefore deemed itself precluded from considering the legal
questions involved in Mrs. Menon's claim, including the validity and effect
of a Turkish divorce decree. However, it held that it did not have power to
grant a request of the U.S. Attorney for an order restraining Mrs. Menon
from prosecuting further suits against UN officials as a mechanism of
extracting support from Mr. Menon. The court did direct that the clerk of
the Small Claims Court reject any further suit in that court brought by
plaintiff, or by any agent or assignee, against UN personnel.
Sovereign and Consular Immunity
Neither the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity nor a novel
argument based on diplomatic propriety served to sustain plaintiff's action
against the Spanish Government and its New York consular representative
in Heaney v. The Government of Spain, decided on July 1, 1971 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, (445 F.2d 501
C.A.2 1971).
Plaintiff, a lawyer, alleged that, as a result of certain litigation in which
he had represented residents of Northern Ireland against the British Government before the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe,
the Spanish Government, through its consul in New York City had employed him to publicize asserted British suppression of civil rights in
Northern Ireland. The purpose, according to the complaint, was to further
the Spanish Government's policy to expel the British from Gibraltar.
Plaintiff argued that, under the restrictive interpretation of the sovereign
immunity doctrine supported by the United States Department of State
[see 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952)], the making of a contract is ipso facto
a commercial transaction and, since commercial activities fall outside the
zone of limited protection afforded by the sovereign immunity doctrine,
any contract may be the basis of suit against the sovereign. Plaintiff further
urged that, since the purpose of the alleged agreement between himself and
the Spanish Government was to cause embarrassment for another government friendly to the United States, namely, Great Britain, it was in violation of well established norms of diplomatic conduct and hence was outside
the scope of whatever immunity the Spanish Government might enjoy in
the pursuit of its legitimate objectives in the United States.
The Court of Appeals disposed of plaintiffs argument that all contracts,
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regardless of their purpose, should be deemed private or commercial acts,
by citing the criteria indicated in Victory Transport, Incorporatedv. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (CCA
2nd 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) for public or political acts
with regard to which sovereigns are immune, which are:
I. Internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
2. Legislative acts, such as nationalization;
3. Acts concerning the armed forces;
4. Acts concerning diplomatic activity; and
5. Public loans.
The court then stated:
The view that all contracts, regardless of their purpose, should be deemed
'private' or 'commercial' acts would lead to the conclusion that a contract by
a foreign government for the purchase of bullets for its army or for the
erection of fortifications do not constitute sovereign acts-a result we viewed
as 'rather astonishing' in Victory Transport (336 F.2d at 359). Hence, unless
and until we are instructed otherwise***, our inquiry will continue to be
governed by the criteria noted above, and under these criteria appellant's
contention that his contract constitutes a 'commercial transaction' must be
rejected. (445 F.2d at pp. 503- 504.)
Concerning plaintiffs second argument, the court observed that plaintiff
had been unable to refer to any law, treaty, State Department directive or
other expression of official view proscribing activities such as those allegedly undertaken by the Spanish Government through plaintiff. Assuming, nevertheless, that such a doctrine might exist, the court stated that "it
would be curious indeed if the application of a doctrine [sovereign immunity] designed to avoid embarrassment for those responsible for the conduct
of our foreign relations were made to depend on a judicial determination of
the propriety of such acts in light of the court's understanding of our
diplomatic objectives. Rather, to condition a foreign sovereign's immunity
on the outcome of a preliminary judicial evaluation of the propriety of its
political conduct, with the attendant risks of embarrassment at the highest
diplomatic levels, would frustrate the very purpose of the doctrine itself."
(Id. at p. 504).
Plaintiff was no more successful insofar as the defendant consul was
concerned. Even on the assumption that the consul's actions, if undertaken
in his capacity as a consular representative of Spain, might not enjoy quite
the same immunity from suit as if he had been acting as a general agent for
his government, the court concluded that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ratified by the United States on November 24, 1969, some
ten months before the institution of plaintiff's suit, effectively barred it.
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Here, again, the argument that the consul's anti-British activities fell outside the scope of proper consular duties failed, and the court pointed out
that "such a narrow reading of the treaty would be inconsistent with its
apparent purpose to eliminate the last vestige of the notion that a consul
was simply a 'commercial representative.' " The court indicated that it was
also influenced by the fact that the State Department has ample means for
dealing with consular officials whose activities it deems unacceptable (see,
e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 23-"Persons
Declared 'Non-Grata' "). In its application of the Vienna Convention, the
court held that the fact that the acts alleged in the complaint had occurred
prior to the Convention's ratification by the United States did not make the
Convention inapplicable since its signature by the United States on April
24, 1963 had "at least the effect of an expression of State Department
policy, and the Supreme Court has instructed that '[iut is * ** not for the
courts to deny any immunity which our government has seen fit to allow,
or to allow an immunity on any grounds which the government has not
seen fit to recognize' (Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35
[1945].)" (445 F.2d at p. 505- 506)
Act of State- State Department Letter
Held Not Determinative
In the latest phase of another lengthy litigation having its roots in
expropriations by the Castro government of property in Cuba owned by
Americans, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. The First National City Bank of New York,
442 F.2d 530 (CA 2, 1971) cert. granted, has applied the act-of-state
doctrine to bar an offset claim by a defendant American bank despite a
State Department letter to the effect that U.S. foreign policy did not
require the doctrine's application.
Plaintiff Banco Nacional originally brought suit in the district court to
recover amounts received by defendant First National City from a sale of
loan collateral in excess of the principal and interest of the loan made by
First National City to Banco Nacional. First National City sought to
set-off against Banco Nacional's claim amounts due it from the expropriation of its properties by the Cuban government. The district court
held in First National City's favor on the basis of the Hickenlooper
Amendment but was reversed by the Second Circuit. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals. held that the Hickenlooper Amendment was inapplicable and
that, therefore, under Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964), the act-of-state doctrine was determinative and prohibited judicial
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scrutiny by U.S. courts into acts of the Cuban government carried out
within its own territory.1
First National City then petitioned for a writ of certiorari and the State
Department wrote a letter to the Supreme Court stating that U.S. foreign
policy interests did not require the application of the act-of-state doctrine
to bar adjudication of the validity of First National City's set-off. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case to the Second
Circuit for reconsideration in the light of the State Department letter but
without any expression of views on the merits.
On remand, First National City argued that, under Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d. Cir. 1954), the letter
relieved the Court from the necessity of applying the act-of-state doctrine
to defeat its offset claim. The Second Circuit, however, rejected this
argument and held that the Bernstein case was the result of a unique
situation and did not control the case before it. The Court set forth the
following circumstances which distinguished Bernstein:
(1) In Bernstein, the acts of state were performed by a government
(Nazi Germany) with which the U.S. had been at war and which no longer
existed at the time of the State Department letter.
(2) The letter in Bernstein was "written during the aftermath of a great
world war" at a time when actions of the Nazi government of the type under
consideration "had been condemned throughout the world as crimes against
humanity."
(3) The letter in Bernstein indicated that it was the affirmative policy of
the U.S. to restitute identifiable property to all those victimized by Nazi
confiscations, whereas in the Banco Nacional situation the letter focused
merely on claimants asserting counter-claims or setoffs.
(4) The balance of equities which strongly favored the party opposing
the act-of-state doctrine in Bernstein was not in evidence in this case in
which, in the Court's view, First National City was seeking a windfall at the
expense of other creditors.
Stressing the exceptional facts of Bernstein and, thus, the narrowness of
the Bernstein exception to the general rule, the Court cited language of the
Supreme Court in Sabbatino to the effect that the act-of-state doctrine
might not apply when "the government which perpetrated the challenged
act of state is no longer in existence, as in the Bernstein case." Therefore,
the Court concluded that Bernstein was "best left narrowly limited to its
own peculiar facts" and that, despite the State Department letter, the
Bernstein exception was inapplicable. It consequently reversed the district
court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
decision and with Sabbatino.
'The initial Second Circuit opinion was discussed in 5
(Jan. 1971).
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In a strong dissent, Judge Hays stated that the majority had misunderstood the basis of the Bernstein exception which required that factors such
as those used by the majority to distinguish Bernstein were matters of
executive, rather than judicial, consideration, and that, once a State Department letter embodying executive conclusions was forthcoming, the
courts must accept the letter as an expression of Executive Policy. The
dissent also suggested that the majority had committed the more fundamental error of usurping the executive function by choosing between competing
foreign policy considerations in deciding that Nazi Germany was "bad"
and Cuba "good."
Greek Inheritance Tax Applied to U.S. Assets
The Appellate Division for the First Department of New York recently
refused to extend the oft-stated rule that a U.S. forum is not available for
the collection of another country's taxes to a case involving a Greek
testator and assets located in New York. Application of Howard, N.Y.L.J.

5/12/7 1, p.1.
The will of the testator, a Greek citizen and domiciliary, was established
in Greece by a proceeding comparable to admission to probate. About
one-third of the assets of the estate were located in the United States and
appellant was appointed ancillary administrator. The proceeding at bar was
instituted by three beneficiaries of the testator, a brother, sister and niece,
who had received from appellant part of their legacies and sought to
compel further advance payments under the Surrogate's Court Procedure
Act. The surrogate had ordered appellant to make the payments despite the
possibility that Greek inheritance taxes on the legacies might exceed their
unpaid balances. Pursuant to a stipulation, payments to the brother and
sister were made and approved by the court after it was calculated that the
balances of their legacies would be sufficient to cover the taxes with which
they would be charged. However, under Greek law a larger tax was due in
respect of the niece's legacy, and payment of her advance would have left
an insufficient residue to cover the tax.
The question, therefore, was whether the niece was entitled to the legacy
free of the Greek inheritance tax. The answer was colored by two facts
peculiar to this situation: (1) The assets out of which the legacies were to
be paid consisted of bank accounts which, under a treaty between Greece
and the United States, were deemed to be situated in the state where the
deceased was domiciled at the date of death, that is, Greece, thereby
subjecting the assets to Greek law; and (2) the niece had appeared in
Greece to contest the will and thus had submitted herself to the jurisdiction
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of the Greek courts as to all questions of the validity and extent of her
inheritance.
In concluding that the niece's legacy was subject to the Greek tax, the
court did not dispute the accepted principle that it was not an available
forum for the collection of taxes of another state, but rather found it
inapplicable, stating that the niece was not using this rule of law as a
protective shield against taxes levied by another country but instead as a
sword to collect moneys. The court indicated that it would not be in
conformity with the intention of the testator if the bequests made by him to
the Greek legatees should be partly confiscated in the payment of inheritance taxes imposed upon the bequests to foreign legatees.
The Appellate Division therefore denied the niece the advance payments she had sought.
Sovereign Immunity -State
Held Determinative

Department Suggestion

A sovereign immunity case recently decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit raised interesting questions, one of
which had not, apparently, been previously considered by a United States
court. fsbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India (India Supply Mission), 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971), application for cert. filed, S. Ct. No.
71-459.
Isbrandtsen had entered into a charter party for the transportation of
grain to India as part of a massive effort by the Indian government to ease
a food shortage. This action for damages was based on improper and
unreasonable detention of plaintiff's vessels preventing discharge of their
cargo. The State Department, however, forwarded a suggestion of immunity to the court. Isbrandtsen contended that, despite the State Department's indication of immunity appellee had waived immunity by its contract as well as by appearing in the action by serving and filing answering
papers.
Isbrandtsen emphasized that, under the Tate letter (26 State Dept. Bull.
984 (1952), sovereign immunity has been granted to foreign governments
only in regard to actions of a public as opposed to a private or commercial
nature. It contended that the actions of the Indian government were wholly
concerned with the commercial purchase of grain and therefore did not
concern matters of public policy and governmental discretion.
Observing that the distinction between public and private acts has never
been adequately defined, the court cited its own decision in Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisart'aGeneral, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied,
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381 U.S. 934 (1965) to the effect that acts which are to be afforded
immunity would be limited to internal administrative acts, legislative acts
such as nationalization, acts concerning the armed forces, acts concerning
diplomatic activity, and public loans. The court noted that in Victory
Transport the contract was similarly for the carriage of grain and that,
therefore, under the facts of the case before it, it "might well find that the
actions of the Indian government were, as appellant contends, purely
private commercial decisions."
However, the critical distinction was the State Department's recommendation of immunity in the present case which was lacking in Victory
Transport. When such a formal recommendation is present, courts need
not reach questions involving a categorization of actions taken by a government. "Hence, once the State Department has ruled in a matter of this
nature, the judiciary will not interfere" (slip op. p. 4564).
The question that had not previously been ruled upon was whether a
suggestion of immunity overrides a contractual waiver by the sovereign in
the form of a provision in the agreement sued upon to the effect that all
disputes arising thereunder are to be determined by a specified court (in
this case the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York). The Court of Appeals concluded that the "potential harm or embarrassment resulting to our government from a judicial finding of jurisdiction,
in the face of an Executive recommendation to the contrary, may be just as
severe where the foreign sovereign had initially contracted to waive its
claim of sovereign immunity as where it had not done so" (slip op. p.
4564).
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